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Abstract 
 
There is considerable evidence in the ergonomics literature that automation can 
significantly reduce operator mental workload.  Furthermore, reducing mental 
workload is not necessarily a good thing, particularly in cases where the level is 
already manageable.  This raises the issue of mental underload, which can be at least 
as detrimental to performance as overload.  However, although it is widely recognised 
that mental underload is detrimental to performance, there are very few attempts to 
explain why this may be the case.  It is argued in this paper that, until the need for a 
human operator is completely eliminated, automation has psychological implications 
relevant in both theoretical and applied domains.  The present paper reviews theories 
of attention, as well as the literature on mental workload and automation, to synthesise 
a new explanation for the effects of mental underload on performance.  Malleable 
Attentional Resources Theory proposes that attentional capacity shrinks to 
accommodate reductions in mental workload, and that this shrinkage is responsible 
for the underload effect.  The theory is discussed with respect to the applied 
implications for ergonomics research. 
 
KEYWORDS: Attention; Automation; Mental Workload; Resources; Working 
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Introduction 
 
More than thirty years ago, the following warning was made to ergonomics 
researchers with respect to operators of automated systems: 
 
“They [human operators] will be on board for the versatility, adaptability and 
reliability they add to an automatic system.  They will be expected to observe 
the environment and use ‘programmed adaptive control’ to change plans.  
They will monitor instruments and repair malfunctioning components.  They 
will control in parallel with the automatic system and take over in the event of 
a failure.  What is the extent of the theory for predicting man-machine 
behaviour in these situations?  It is almost nil.”  (Young, 1969; p. 672) 
 
It would be unfair and inaccurate to suggest that the current state of theory is the 
same.  Nevertheless, it would also be optimistic to say that the theoretical waters are 
anything other than muddied.  Explanations for human performance with automated 
systems have ranged from effort (Desmond, Hancock & Monette, 1998; Matthews, 
Sparkes & Bygrave, 1996), through situation awareness (Endsley & Kiris, 1995; 
Kaber & Endsley, 1997) and trust (Lee & Moray, 1994; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997), 
to vigilance (Molloy & Parasuraman, 1996; Parasuraman, Mouloua, Molloy & 
Hilburn, 1996) and mental workload (Stanton, Young & McCaulder, 1997).  The 
general consensus (e.g., Wilson & Rajan, 1995) is that mental workload optimisation 
is crucial to maintaining effective task performance.  Such optimisation inevitably 
involves a balancing act between demands and resources of both task and operator.  
This paper focuses upon some of the factors which can affect such a balance.  
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Theories of attention and mental workload are drawn upon in an effort to describe and 
explain the effects of automation on performance. 
 
Background 
Automation is defined as “the execution by a machine agent (usually a computer) of a 
function that was previously carried out by a human” (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; p. 
231).  Designers of complex systems often use the technology at their disposal to aid 
operators, and even relieve them of their duties to some extent, in an attempt to 
eliminate error and improve performance.  Since the vast majority of problems in 
safety-critical environments is popularly attributed to ‘human error’ (e.g., Coyne, 
1994, estimates this majority at 90% for traffic accidents), substituting the weak link 
in the system (i.e., the human) seems the logical thing to do. 
 
It is certainly true that automation can bring benefits of improved performance and 
efficiency in systems (Byrne, 1996, reports that automated flight decks are statistically 
safer than conventional aircraft).  Previous experience, though, suggests that the 
solution for improved performance and safety is not as simple as the installation of 
automation.  Modern technological systems are shifting the operator’s task burden to a 
psychological level, rather than a physical one.  In automating a task, then, the 
operator’s role is qualitatively changed, and this introduces a plethora of new 
concerns and problems (Kantowitz & Campbell, 1996; Stanton & Marsden, 1996). 
 
Performance problems with automation have variously been attributed to factors such 
as fatigue (Desmond et al., 1998; Matthews et al., 1996), vigilance (Molloy & 
Parasuraman, 1996; Parasuraman et al., 1996), or trust (Lee & Moray, 1994; 
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Parasuraman & Riley, 1997), to name but a few.  These literatures are beyond the 
scope of the present review, but are all symptomatic of operators being ‘out-of-the-
loop’ (Endsley & Kiris, 1995).  It is believed that simply removing the human from 
active control can have a direct bearing on their performance.  However, it is likely 
that there is a more general factor which can influence performance, since it is 
possible to find exceptions to all of these rules. 
 
One particular problem associated with automation is that of mental workload 
(MWL).  One of the purposes of automation is to reduce MWL, thereby improving 
performance.  If an operator is overloaded with demands, performance is likely to 
falter.  Intuitively, automation can help in such situations.  However, in many 
domains MWL is only excessive in exceptional circumstances, and automation 
simply relieves the operator of demands s/he can quite readily cope with (Reason, 
1998; 1990; Stanton & Marsden, 1996).  Ironically, then, automated systems have the 
potential for imposing mental underload.  It is precisely this problem which the 
present paper is concerned with.  Underload is at least as serious an issue as overload 
(Leplat, 1978; Schlegel, 1993), and can be detrimental to performance (Desmond & 
Hoyes, 1996).  However, its effects on performance, and the explanations for such, 
have not been fully documented as yet. 
 
The theoretical impetus for this review comes primarily from MWL.  This concept is 
inextricably linked with theories of attention.  The opinion here is that excessively 
low MWL can adversely affect performance.  The applied element of this research is 
concerned with how these potential effects on MWL and attention will affect 
performance.  Ultimately, such research should be able to provide recommendations 
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for the design of future systems.  By discovering adverse effects of automation in the 
largely uncharted territory of mental underload, one may contribute to designing for 
the user and optimise the performance of the system as a whole. 
 
The following literature review is structured to emphasise the theoretical elements of 
the research.  Relevant research in attention is summarised, paying particular attention 
to the original formulation of attentional resources theory and how it differs from 
other theoretical positions, such as working memory.  This provides the background 
for the ensuing discussions of automation and mental workload.  Finally, the review is 
used to synthesise a new theory of attention in an effort to parsimoniously describe, 
explain, and predict the effects of mental underload on performance. 
 
 
Attention 
 
Background 
The classic and often-cited early work is that of Kahneman (1973), who proposed a 
capacity model of attention as an alternative to bottleneck or filter theories (see 
Eysenck & Keane, 1990, for a review).  Essentially, the capacity model proposes a 
single resource view of attention - that is, attention is viewed as one whole pool of 
resources.  This pool has a finite limit, therefore the ability to perform two separate 
concurrent activities depends upon the effective allocation of attention to each.  
Interference between tasks depends upon the demands which each separately impose 
– when task demands drain the pool, performance will suffer. 
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Other researchers share the notion of a common resource pool.  Norman & Bobrow 
(1975) described how performance may be constrained by the quality of input (data-
limited) or by processing resources (resource-limited).  Again, this view holds that if 
the demands of two tasks exceed the upper limit of resources, interference will occur 
and performance will deteriorate.  Early researchers were of the opinion that the 
capacity limit may be susceptible to influences such as age, arousal, or mood (Hasher 
& Zacks, 1979; Humphreys & Revelle, 1984; Kahneman, 1973).  Long-term 
variations in these factors could depress the limit, with concomitant effects on 
performance. 
 
Later research found some major flaws with the single resource approach.  For 
instance, Wickens (1984; 1992) described experiments whereby two tasks were 
perfectly time-shared (i.e., performed concurrently) even when the difficulty of either 
was manipulated.  This was seen as a limitation of single resource theory, which 
predicted that difficulty manipulations should eventually lead to altered performance 
on one or both tasks.  Thus, multiple resources theory emerged (Wickens, 1984; 1992; 
Wickens & Liu, 1988).  Multiple resources theory posits that there are separate pools 
of resources along three dichotomous dimensions.  The first dimension is processing 
stages – early vs. late.  Perception and central processing (i.e., cognitive activity) are 
said to demand separate resources from response selection and execution.  The second 
dimension is input modalities - auditory vs. visual.  Performance of two simultaneous 
tasks will be better if one is presented visually and the other presented auditorily, 
rather than using the same modality for both.  Finally, the theory states that there are 
separate resources for whether a task is processed verbally or spatially.  This 
dichotomy also holds for response execution, whereby less dual-task interference 
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occurs if one task is responded to vocally and the other demands a manual response.  
Thus, there will only be a trade-off between task difficulty and performance to the 
extent that two concurrent tasks share resources on these dimensions (Wickens, 1992) 
- interference is a joint function of difficulty (resource demand) and shared processing 
mechanisms (resource competition). 
 
Multiple resources and working memory 
To any student of cognitive psychology, there would seem to be a degree of overlap 
between multiple resources theory and models of working memory (as described by 
Baddeley, 1990; Wickens, Gordon & Liu, 1998).  In particular, the verbal and spatial 
processing codes seem to correspond quite heavily with the phonological loop and the 
visuospatial sketchpad. 
 
Traditional models of memory (see e.g., Baddeley, 1990; Eysenck & Keane, 1990, for 
basic explanations) view attention as a filter, a perceptual selection mechanism 
whereby whatever is attended to gets transferred to short-term memory.  In contrast, 
working memory assigns short-term storage a more active role in cognition, acting as 
a kind of buffer between perception and long-term memory.  Information from each 
source is coordinated by the central executive, and is used to carry out whatever task 
is at hand. 
 
The distinction between working memory and attentional resources is therefore 
somewhat blurred, with both theories seeming to involve similar mechanisms.  
Multiple resources theory has moved the locus of attention from sensory and 
perceptual input to central processing and even response execution.  As such, the 
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theory is invading the territory of working memory.  Furthermore, according to 
Wickens (1992), information processing draws upon separate resources depending on 
whether the task is verbal or spatial.  By implication, this processing would involve 
the integration of information from the outside world and from experience.  This 
integration is exactly the function of working memory, which also separates 
processing according to verbal or spatial elements (Baddeley, 1986; 1990).  Finally, 
an additional element of confusion between multiple resources theory and working 
memory is introduced as the central executive component of working memory is often 
thought of as a supervisory attentional system (Baddeley, 1986; 1990).  By 
specifically using the term ‘attentional’, working memory theorists have surrendered 
to the invasion of their territory, and are themselves implying that working memory 
and attentional resources are somehow related. 
 
Unfortunately, there seems to be very little literature on distinguishing the two 
models.  In the undergraduate textbook, Wickens et al. (1998) describe at different 
points both working memory and multiple resources, with only a brief mention of 
working memory related to Wickens’ definition of central processing.  Furthermore, 
Baddeley’s own Working Memory book (1986) fails to mention multiple resources 
theory at any point, despite a self-admitted attempt to resolve concepts of working 
memory and attention.  Apparently, attention researchers are content to work with 
resource models without acknowledging working memory, and vice-versa. 
 
There are a few exceptions to this.  Conway & Engle (1994) argued that working 
memory capacity is indirectly related to attentional resources.  Retrieval from working 
memory depends upon the ability to inhibit irrelevant information, which is in itself 
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resource demanding.  This implies a distinction between the capacities of working 
memory and attentional resources, even though one is reflected in the other.  Some 
support for this was found in a study of intelligence (Necka, 1996).  Actual 
intelligence (as opposed to potential intelligence) was found to be determined by 
momentary values of attentional resources and working memory capacity.  These are 
affected by arousal - as arousal increases, so do attentional resources, but working 
memory capacity decreases.  Actual performance therefore depends on whether an 
optimal arousal level can be reached – the classic inverted-U curve of Yerkes & 
Dodson (1908). 
 
One interesting paper directly pits multiple resources theory against working memory 
as alternative explanations of interference effects in timing (Brown, 1997).  If a 
participant attempts to perform two similar tasks at the same time, their performance 
on each will be worse than when performing the tasks separately.  Usually, in the 
absence of any instructions to prioritise one task over the other, the interference effect 
will be symmetrical; that is, both tasks will be equally affected.  However, the 
interference effect when trying to maintain timing (i.e., make a response every 3s) 
with a concurrent nontemporal task (such as visual search, or tracking) seems to be 
asymmetrical.  Brown (1997) found that performance on search or tracking tasks was 
not affected by a simultaneous timing task, but timing performance was adversely 
affected by these concurrent tasks.  Mental arithmetic was the only concurrent task for 
which bidirectional interference was observed. 
 
Brown’s (1997) interpretation of multiple resources theory was that timing involves 
verbal resources at the perceptual/central stages, whereas search and tracking are 
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spatial tasks.  This argument, though, still fails to explain the asymmetry.  If anything, 
there should be minimal interference, as the tasks draw on separate resource pools.  In 
the event of an interference effect, it should affect both tasks in a similar manner, 
rather than affecting one task while leaving the other untouched.  On the other hand, 
working memory, with its central executive, can offer an explanation.  The central 
executive controls attentional and coordinational functions, such as allocating 
attention between dual tasks.  Mental arithmetic and timing both draw on the central 
executive, which is why bidirectional interference occurs between these two tasks.  
Simple visual search or tracking tasks, on the other hand, only use the visuospatial 
sketchpad.  Therefore, the nontemporal tasks do not suffer with a concurrent timing 
task, as the visuospatial sketchpad is essentially still dedicated to a single task.  
However, the mere introduction of a dual-task scenario draws on the coordination 
skills of the central executive, which also looks after temporal activities, hence the 
interference effect on timing.  Brown (1997) concludes that working memory and 
multiple resources both attempt to explain similar phenomena and rely on similar 
concepts, but working memory is distinct in its provision for general purpose 
resources.  Brown (ibid.) also hints, though, that there is some speculation on a 
general pool of resources in multiple resources theory, evidence for which has been 
cited elsewhere (see Matthews et al., 1996). 
 
Thus we see that the two theories are in fact very similar, but were derived from 
different paradigms and never the twain shall meet.  Most applications of multiple 
resources theory have been just that – applied, under the umbrella of ergonomics.  
Most theoretical work on attention focuses on selectivity or divided attention.  In 
considering a review of three decades of attention research, Baddeley (1986) 
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concludes that attention theories could not provide insights into the central executive, 
as most attention research is concerned with perception rather than the control of 
memory and action.  It is perhaps not surprising then that there has been very little 
overlap between these two otherwise very related areas of cognition. 
 
At present, then, there is very little to choose between multiple resources and working 
memory theories.  There is an area of common ground, though, in that both are 
ultimately concerned with performance, which is mediated in each mechanism by 
physiological arousal.  It is widely understood that there is a curvilinear relationship 
between arousal and performance (Kahneman, 1973; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908).  There 
is some speculation that this is due to two competing processes: a positive linear 
relation between arousal and attentional resources, and an inverse relation between 
arousal and working memory (Humphreys & Revelle, 1984; Necka, 1996).  If 
attentional resources are needed to make use of information in working memory 
(Conway & Engle, 1994; Hasher & Zacks, 1979), this would explain the inverted-U 
effect on performance.  Now, a similar relationship exists between MWL and 
performance, which partly forms the crux of this paper.  Before considering that, 
though, it is necessary to cover some background on MWL. 
 
Throughout this paper, the terms ‘resources’ and ‘capacity’ will generally be used in 
reference to attentional resource theories.  The working memory debate is left aside 
for a moment while the literature review continues, although it will be returned to at 
relevant points. 
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Attention and MWL 
Attentional resource theories form a useful basis for describing MWL (see Young & 
Stanton, 2001b, for a full review and definition of MWL).  These theories assume that 
individuals possess a finite attentional capacity which may be allocated to one or more 
tasks.  Essentially, MWL represents the proportion of resources required to meet the 
task demands (Welford, 1978).  If demands begin to exceed capacity, the skilled 
operator either adjusts their strategy to compensate (Singleton, 1989), or performance 
degrades.  Such a view makes clear predictions about mental workload in any given 
situation, and observations of performance or behaviour provide simple indications of 
mental workload. 
 
Although two tasks may impose different levels of mental workload, there may be 
little variation in the overt performance of each if both are within the total capacity of 
the operator.  However, changes in behaviour or operator state can still provide 
information about the level of mental workload.  Investing resources in a task is a 
voluntary and effortful process to meet demands, so performance can be maintained at 
the cost of individual strain or vice-versa (Hockey, 1997).  Excessive load can also 
affect selective attention, leading to narrowed or inefficient sampling (Liao & Moray, 
1993; Sanders & McCormick, 1993). 
 
Resource models of workload can therefore provide a rational framework for defining 
mental workload.  There is some debate, though, as to whether single resource models 
are more appropriate than multiple resource theory.  Firstly, multiple resource 
explanations of MWL are context dependent, derived in dual-task laboratory settings, 
making it difficult to draw quantitative predictions for real-world design problems 
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(Hancock & Caird, 1993; Liao & Moray, 1993).  In addition, multiple resource 
models do not consider nonattentional factors, such as experience (Selcon, Taylor & 
Koritsas, 1991).  As an alternative, Liao & Moray (1993) posited that a single channel 
MWL model is of more use in real world situations, which generally have more than 
two tasks.  However, they also stated that the multiple resource approach remains a 
superior model in purely dual task scenarios. 
 
In terms of design, many authors agree that a key goal is to maximise the match 
between task demands and human capacity (e.g., Bainbridge, 1991; Gopher & 
Kimchi, 1989; Lovesey, 1995; Neerincx & Griffioen, 1996).  For instance, Dingus, 
Antin, Hulse & Wierwille (1989) suggested some design improvements to reduce the 
demand of vehicle navigation displays (and hence their impact on the driving task).  
These were primarily aimed at improving the availability of information on the 
displays, to be more compatible with the driver’s short glance strategy.  Similarly, 
Selcon, Hardiman, Croft & Endsley (1996) designed a visuo-spatial display for threat 
assessment in combat aircraft, maximising resource compatibility with the primary 
task.  It was found that this display increased spare attentional capacity compared to 
the previous text-based display.  Computer-based decision support can also reduce 
attention on the primary task (Hoyes, 1994, uses air traffic control as an example, 
however the principle is applicable across domains).  As modern technology in many 
working environments imposes more cognitive demands upon operators than physical 
demands (Singleton, 1989), the understanding of how MWL impinges on 
performance is critical.  With that in mind, the review now turns to an in-depth 
analysis of MWL with respect to a particular class of technology – automation. 
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 Automation and Mental Workload 
 
Historically, the technological revolution has gradually removed the operators of 
many complex systems from front-line levels of control, to having their actions 
relayed via an intervening mass of computers and microprocessors.  In the extreme, 
the operator’s task is completely assumed by automation.  Instead of actively 
controlling the system, the operator of an automated system now becomes a passive 
monitor.  Intuitively, this should be an easier task and thereby facilitate performance 
improvements.  As with many areas of research, though, intuition is often proved 
wrong.  Seminal articles (Bainbridge, 1982; Norman, 1990; 1991; Reason, 1988; 
1990) have criticised automation for being designed inappropriately and degrading the 
skills of operators, and empirical studies have supported this position.  Active 
controllers have consistently demonstrated superior performance in failure detection 
than passive monitors (e.g., Desmond et al., 1998; Ephrath & Young, 1981; Kessel & 
Wickens, 1982; Wickens & Kessel, 1981; Young, 1969).  Early research attributed 
this advantage to the availability of proprioceptive information for the active 
controllers, which may contribute to an improved internal model of system operation 
(Ephrath & Young, 1981; Kessel & Wickens, 1982).  More recently, problems such as 
vigilance (Parasuraman, 1987), complacency (Parasuraman, Singh, Molloy, & 
Parasuraman, 1992), and trust (Lee & Moray, 1994; Muir & Moray, 1996) have been 
touted as causes for performance differences between manual and automated control.  
In particular, the effects of automation on MWL has been a well-explored avenue of 
research. 
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It may seem paradoxical, but automated systems can both reduce and increase MWL.  
For instance, it has been observed (Hughes & Dornheim, 1995) that glass cockpits in 
commercial aircraft have relieved workload in areas such as reduced display clutter, 
and more automated flight procedures.  Increased trust in the automation also serves 
to relieve MWL, as the operator does not feel such a burden of monitoring the system 
(Kantowitz & Campbell, 1996).  However, the same cockpit systems can increase 
workload by presenting operators with more options in their task and causing mode 
confusions (Hilburn, 1997).  This can lead to mental underload during highly 
automated activities such as cruise flight, but mental overload during more critical 
operations such as take-off and landing (Parasuraman et al., 1996).  Others have 
predicted that future systems could increase complexity (Labiale, 1997; Lovesey, 
1995) or excessively reduce demands (Roscoe, 1992; Schlegel, 1993) in both aircraft 
and cars. 
 
Extremes of MWL can create conditions of overload or underload, which may both be 
detrimental to performance (Wilson & Rajan, 1995).  The notion of an optimal level 
of MWL is based on attentional resource theory, whereby overload or underload can 
each cause psychological strain due to a mismatch between demands and capabilities 
(Byrne & Parasuraman, 1996; Gopher & Kimchi, 1989).  It is becoming accepted that 
optimal performance will be the reward for optimised demands (Hancock & Caird, 
1993). 
 
Overload occurs if the demands of a task are beyond the limited attentional capacity 
of the operator.  This can be worsened if the operator becomes stressed, as stress is 
itself resource demanding and can compound cognitive interference (Matthews & 
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Desmond, 1995).  Operators and automated systems are essentially members of the 
same team.  Effective performance in any team is dependent upon good coordination 
and communication.  However, automated systems are inherently bad at these tasks.  
The performance of the operator is hindered by the increase in processing load 
resulting from the additional task of collecting information about the system state.  
This is further complicated by the extent of the operator’s knowledge about the 
system.  In the event of manual takeover, the operator must be acutely aware of the 
system state, so as to match their actions to those which the computer is executing.  If 
the user misperceives the state of the system, s/he could end up in a conflict with the 
computer for control.  In sum, a lack of feedback, an increase in vigilance demands 
(Hancock & Verwey, 1997), and increased decision options in a given situation 
(Hilburn, 1997) are all ways in which automation can overload the operator. 
 
Conversely, those susceptible to stress or fatigue may find their performance to be 
worse in conditions of underload, as there is a failure to mobilise compensatory effort 
appropriately to cope with the demands (Desmond et al., 1998; Matthews & 
Desmond, 1997).  Underload has also been associated with passivity, with optimal 
MWL reflecting a need to exercise a level of control (Hockey, Briner, Tatersall & 
Wiethoff, 1989).  The consequences of excessively low mental demands are not often 
given the consideration they merit, despite being at least as serious as those of mental 
overload (Hancock & Parasuraman, 1992).  Indeed, underload is possibly of greater 
concern, as it is more difficult to detect than overload (Hancock & Verwey, 1997).  
There is some evidence that errors and workload are related according to a U-shaped 
function (Desmond & Hoyes, 1996).  This suggests that operators might use less 
efficient strategies in such circumstances, and are failing to match their effort 
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appropriately to the task.  Although there is widespread concern about mental 
underload, and even some evidence to justify this, very few researchers seem to be 
actively involved in exploring the issue. 
 
There has been a small amount of empirical work directed at automated vehicle 
systems, with implications for mental underload.  A handful of studies (e.g., de 
Waard, van der Hulst, Hoedemaeker & Brookhuis, 1999; Desmond et al., 1998; 
Stanton et al., 1997) used driving simulators to explore the effects of automation 
failure on driver performance.  Performance in the automated conditions was 
consistently inferior to manual control conditions, and was generally associated with 
reductions in MWL. 
 
The curvilinear relation between MWL and performance is reminiscent of that 
between arousal and performance.  However, where there is some explanation of the 
latter association (invoking attentional resources and working memory, discussed 
above), there is precious little theory underpinning the effects of MWL on 
performance.  It could be, of course, that MWL and arousal are intimately related 
themselves, thus the same mechanism is responsible for performance variations.  
Indeed, many physiological measures of MWL depend on this link.  However, the 
link is not perfect, and the measures may dissociate due to larger influences such as 
muscle movements or circadian rhythms.  So, there must be a more direct connection 
between MWL and performance.  Returning to the arousal issue, it was discussed 
previously that this may affect attentional resources and working memory, resulting in 
the inverted-U relation with performance.  It could be, then, that MWL affects 
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attentional resources in the same way.  This premise is the basis for the theory which 
will be proposed in the closing section of this paper. 
 
 
Malleable Attentional Resources Theory 
 
On the basis of the literature review presented here, the authors offer a new hypothesis 
centred around the issue of mental underload with automation.  The hypothesis states 
that mental underload can lead to performance degradation due to shrinkage of 
attentional resources.  This hypothesis is encapsulated in a concept proposed here as 
malleable attentional resources theory (MART). 
 
Thus far we have seen that automation can reduce MWL, and also that automation can 
adversely affect performance compared to manual control.  Extrapolating from these 
results leads to the suggestion that mental underload can be detrimental to 
performance, just as mental overload can.  Although a link between mental underload 
and performance has yet to be firmly established, there is a strong belief in the 
literature that underload should be considered at least as seriously as overload (e.g., 
Hancock & Parasuraman, 1992). 
 
Many of the papers on MWL cited above describe the dangers of underload in terms 
of potential degradation of performance.  With a few notable exceptions, though (e.g., 
Desmond et al., 1998; Matthews & Desmond, 1997), there is a gap in the literature for 
explanations of why mental underload should be detrimental to performance.  
Although we have not considered other explanations (such as situation awareness, 
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vigilance, fatigue, or trust) in any detail, we believe that turning to the core literature 
in attention can provide a parsimonious answer which can encompass all of these. 
 
Applied research on attention implicitly assumes that the size of resource pools is 
fixed.  Capacity may change with long-term fluctuations in arousal, mood, or age 
(Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Humphreys & Revelle, 1984; Kahneman, 1973), but in most 
applied experiments on attention these factors are assumed to be stable within 
participants.  Performance on primary or secondary tasks therefore simply depends on 
demand not exceeding some arbitrary maximum.  There is a possibility, though, that 
this limit may change in the relatively short term, depending on task circumstances.  
This introduces the concept of malleable attentional resource pools.  Evidence is 
accumulating that simply reducing demand is not necessarily a key to improving 
performance.  It is proposed that resources may actually shrink to accommodate any 
demand reduction, in a converse of the ‘work expands to fill the time available’ tenet.  
This could explain the apparent degradation of attention and performance observed in 
low demand tasks.  If the maximum capacity of an operator has been limited as a 
consequence of the task, it is not surprising that they cannot cope when a critical 
situation arises (see Figure 1).  MART therefore potentially explains why mental 
underload can lead to performance degradation, whilst remaining grounded in 
established theories of attention. 
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Figure 1: Pictorial representation of performance differences under a 
malleable attentional resources hypothesis. 
 
 
In Figure 1, the bars represent the level of MWL and, by the logic of MART, the 
respective attentional capacity of the operator.  The heavy line indicates the level of 
attentional resources a failure event would demand.  As can clearly be seen, this is 
within the capacity of the high MWL operator, but beyond that at low MWL.  It is for 
this reason that performance in responding to critical situations is predicted to be 
worse in conditions of mental underload. 
 
Imagine someone driving a fully automated car.  This is a situation which 
considerably reduces MWL.  Assuming an attentional demand model of MWL (cf. 
Liao & Moray, 1993; Young & Stanton, 2001b), this translates to low demand on 
resources.  Now, MART posits that the size of the relevant resource pool will 
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temporarily diminish, as it is not required.  This could result in poorer performance on 
any subsidiary tasks, or problems if the driver is suddenly faced with increased 
demand (e.g., if the automation fails). 
 
The idea that the level of task demands can influence cognitive processing has been 
hinted at in previous research.  Buck, Payne & Barany (1994) quoted the ‘par 
hypothesis’ to explain some of their results.  This states that, as demands fluctuate, 
operators increase or decrease the amount of effort invested in a task to maintain 
performance at a set level.  This level represents an operator’s personal par for that 
task.  There is some support for this notion.  Liao & Moray (1993) found that 
participants invest more effort with higher time pressure, which may increase 
capacity.  Conversely, Desmond & Hoyes (1996) concluded that a decrease in 
performance at low levels of demand might be due to a failure to mobilise effort 
appropriately to match the task.  MART reflects these attitudes, but is a little more 
parsimonious with respect to current knowledge.  Being grounded in theories of 
attention, it does not have to appeal to extraneous concepts such as effort or 
motivation. 
 
MART is also consistent with other theories of performance, such as working 
memory.  The inverted-U relationship between arousal and performance was 
discussed previously as being due to competing processes of attentional resources and 
working memory.  It has already been argued that MWL does not necessarily 
correlate with arousal directly, but the malleable resources perspective suggests that 
MWL can have the same influence, by affecting attentional capacity.  In that respect, 
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the hypothesis is by no means radical or novel, but simply taking existing ideas from 
the basic literature and applying them in a new domain. 
 
A further implication concerns the traditional views of demand-performance 
relationships.  Fixed capacity models assume that performance remains at ceiling, and 
is data-limited, as long as demands remain within the attentional capacity of the 
operator (Norman & Bobrow, 1975; Stokes, Wickens & Kite, 1990).  Performance 
only begins to decline as the task demands approach the maximum resource 
availability.  This is the very essence of the dual-task approach.  Because two tasks 
can vary in objective difficulty, yet remain within the total capacity of the operator, 
overt performance differences will not be observed.  A secondary task can assess 
remaining capacity once the primary task has taken its toll, and can therefore 
differentiate between such levels of difficulty.  However, MART predicts that instead, 
performance is largely resource-limited for the full range of task demands.  This 
would explain why some researchers (e.g., Roscoe, 1992) have found an inverted-U 
relation between task demands and performance.  At low levels of demand, attentional 
capacity is reduced, artificially limiting the performance ceiling.  If task demands 
exceed the maximum capacity of the operator, performance degrades.  Only at 
medium levels of demand are resources (and hence performance) optimised.  These 
ideas are best understood in figures 2 and 3. 
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Figure 2: Relation between task demands and performance under a fixed 
capacity model (adapted from Stokes et al., 1990). 
 
Figure 2 represents the textbook approach, in which performance remains constant 
until task demands begin to exceed capacity, reflecting the invariance of the capacity 
upper limit.  However, in figure 3, the theory of malleable attentional resources has 
been applied to depress the upper capacity limit at lower task demands.  This also 
limits the performance ceiling, effectively creating the classic inverted-U relation 
between task demands and performance. 
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Figure 3: Relation between task demands and performance under a malleable 
attentional resources model. 
 
Adopting a malleable attentional resources position would therefore help to explain 
the results from a number of studies in which performance and MWL are positively 
correlated (e.g., Moss & Triggs, 1997; Roscoe, 1992; Scallen, Hancock & Duley, 
1995; Thornton, Braun, Bowers & Morgan, 1992).  Indeed, even basic memory 
research reviewed by Baddeley (1986) could be interpreted as support for MART.  A 
positive correlation between memory span and concurrent reasoning was explained in 
terms of the demanding influence of error-correction, but the results are also 
consistent with a change in resource capacity. 
 
On the basis of MART, it is predicted that excessively low mental workload, such as 
may be presented by automation, could result in a reduction of attentional resources.  
Young & Stanton (2001a) used a neat measure of resource capacity (figure 4) to 
demonstrate that this was indeed the case.  By comparing eye movements to 
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responses to a secondary task, it was found that attentional capacity directly 
correlated with MWL.  This was the first investigation into MART, and provided 
enough proof to warrant further investigations. 
 
STcr where AR = Attention Ratio 
STt  ST = Secondary Task 
  cr = correct responses 
AR = 
 
  t = time 
 
Figure 4: Derivation of Attention Ratio by Young & Stanton (2001a), used to 
infer attentional resource capacity.  Number of correct responses on a 
secondary task were divided by total duration of glances directed at that task. 
 
If enough support is found for MART, it will have far-reaching implications for both 
theoretical and applied researchers.  Multiple resources theory (cf. Wickens, 1992), 
and many studies based upon it, have implicitly assumed that the size of resource 
pools is invariant across tasks.  The conclusions of such studies often hinge upon the 
assumption that the total demands of primary and secondary tasks equals a constant.  
For instance, timesharing or multitasking experiments tend to infer that performance 
decrements are simply indicative of maximal capacity boundaries being exceeded 
(e.g., Brown, 1978; Buck & Ings, 1997; Harms, 1991; Liao & Moray, 1993; Liu, 
1996).  These inferences do not account for the possibility of the capacity limit 
adjusting to demands.  Many such studies using dual- or multiple-task techniques to 
assess mental workload and performance may have to be reassessed.  It may no longer 
be possible to directly compare different primary tasks against each other using the 
same secondary task.  Although an increase in secondary task responses would still 
indicate an easier primary task, this cannot then be extrapolated to make absolute and 
quantitative deductions about the resource demands of the primary task.  By virtue of 
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the fact that the addition of primary and secondary task demands no longer equals a 
constant, the whole dual-task methodology is thrown into turmoil. 
 
For applied researchers, there is now a parsimonious theoretical explanation for the 
effects of underload on performance.  The idea of an optimal level of MWL (Hancock 
& Caird, 1993) is clearly supported, with performance suffering if demands are either 
too low (underload) or too high (overload).  Starting with underload conditions, 
malleable attentional resources theory predicts that gradual increases in demands 
would facilitate performance.  Such facilitation is particularly evident if suddenly 
required to assume additional tasks (or resume control of an automated system).  The 
operator who had been working under higher demands (and therefore increased 
attentional capacity) will cope better with an emergency situation than the 
underloaded operator.  Indeed, this is probably the single most important prediction of 
MART.  If resources have shrunk in response to reduced task demands, a sudden 
increase in demand – even if it is within the ordinary capacity of the operator – cannot 
be tolerated.  Given the initial support for MART under normal operations (Young & 
Stanton, 2001a), the logical next step would be to perform a structured investigation 
of performance when reclaiming control from automation in a failure scenario.  
Although many authors have tackled this (e.g., de Waard et al., 1999; Desmond et al., 
1998; Nilsson, 1995; Stanton et al., 1997), the issue has not yet been specifically 
approached with malleable attentional resources in mind. 
 
In sum, the present paper has taken a back-to-basics approach to analysing the 
theoretical literature, and used it to arrive at a new explanation for the effects of 
mental underload on performance.  To the authors’ knowledge, the connection 
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between mental workload and attentional resource size has not been made previously, 
despite the fact that similar ideas have been echoed for physiological arousal.  This is 
probably due to the fact that since the conception of a resource model of attention, 
applied research has simplified matters by implicitly assuming that resources are 
fixed, thus hindering theoretical progress.  By considering basic theory, though, 
applied research will also benefit.  Malleable attentional resources theory represents 
an effort towards that goal, in the hope of advancing knowledge in both theoretical 
and applied domains. 
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